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Abstract
This paper considers learning when the distinction between risk and ambiguity
matters. It ﬁrst describes thought experiments, dynamic variants of those pro-
vided by Ellsberg, that highlight a sense in which the Bayesian learning model is
extreme - it models agents who are implausibly ambitious about what they can
learn in complicated environments. The paper then provides a generalization of
the Bayesian model that accommodates the intuitive choices in the thought ex-
periments. In particular, the model allows decision-makers’ conﬁdence about the
environment to change — along with beliefs — as they learn. A calibrated portfolio
choice application shows how this property induces a trend towards more stock
market participation and investment.
1I N T R O D U C T I O N
Models of learning typically assume that agents assign (subjective) probabilities to all
relevant uncertain events. As a result, they leave no role for conﬁdence in probability
assessments; in particular, the degree of conﬁdence does not aﬀect behavior. Thus,
for example, agents do not distinguish between risky situations, where the odds are
objectively known, and ambiguous situations, where they may have little information
and hence also little conﬁdence regarding the true odds. The Ellsberg Paradox has
shown that this distinction is behaviorally meaningful in a static context: people treat
ambiguous bets diﬀerently from risky ones. Importantly, the lack of conﬁdence reﬂected
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1by choices in the Ellsberg Paradox cannot be rationalized by any probability belief. In
particular, it is inconsistent with the foundations of Bayesian models of learning.
This paper considers learning when the distinction between risk and ambiguity mat-
ters. We assume that decision makers view data as being generated by the same memory-
less mechanism in every period. This ap r i o r iview motivates the exchangeable Bayesian
model of learning and is commonly imposed on learners in a wide variety of economic
applications. We view our principal contribution as two-fold. First, we describe exam-
ples or thought experiments, dynamic variants of those provided by Ellsberg, in which
intuitive behavior contradicts the (exchangeable) Bayesian learning model. As in the
static setting addressed by the Ellsberg Paradox, an agent may lack conﬁdence in her
initial information about the environment. However, conﬁdence may now change as the
agent learns. The examples reveal also another sense in which the Bayesian model is
extreme - it models agents who are very ambitious about what they can learn, even in
very complicated environments.
Our second contribution is to provide a generalization of the Bayesian model that
accommodates the intuitive choices in the thought experiments. The model describes
how the conﬁdence of ambiguity averse decision-makers changes over time. Beliefs and
conﬁdence are jointly represented by an evolving set of conditional distributions over
f u t u r es t a t e so ft h ew o r l d .T h i ss e tm a ys h r i n ko v e rt i m ea sa g e n t sb e c o m em o r ef a m i l i a r
with the environment, but it may also expand if new information is surprising relative to
past experience. We argue also that it models agents who take the complexity of their
environment seriously and therefore are less ambitious than Bayesians about how much
can be learned. Finally, we show that the model is tractable in economic settings by
applying it to dynamic portfolio choice.
The Bayesian model of learning about a memoryless mechanism is summarized by a
triple (Θ,µ 0, ),w h e r eΘ is a parameter space, µ0 is a prior over parameters, and   is a
likelihood. The parameter space represents features of the data generating mechanism
that the decision-maker tries to learn. The prior µ0 represents initial beliefs about para-
meters. For a given parameter value θ ∈ Θ, the data are an independent and identically
distributed sequence of signals {st}
∞
t=1, where the distribution of any signal st is described
by the probability measure  (·|θ) on the period state space St = S. The triple (Θ,µ 0, )
is the decision-maker’s theory of how data are generated. This theory incorporates both
prior information (through µ0)a n dav i e wo fh o wt h es i g n a l sa r er e l a t e dt ot h eu n d e r l y i n g
parameter (through  ). Beliefs on (payoﬀ-relevant) states are equivalently represented by
a probability measure p on sequences of signals (that is, on S∞), or by the process {pt} of











where st =( s1,...,st) denotes the sample history at t and where µt is the posterior belief
about θ, derived via Bayes’ Rule.
We generalize the Bayesian learning model within the decision-theoretic framework
2of recursive multiple-priors utility, a model of utility put forth in Epstein and Wang [10]
and axiomatized in Epstein and Schneider [7], that extends Gilboa and Schmeidler’s [12]
model of decision making under ambiguity to an intertemporal setting. Under recursive
multiple-priors utility, beliefs and conﬁdence are determined by a process {Pt} giving
for each time and history a set of one-step-ahead conditionals. Since these sets describe
responses to data, they are the natural vehicle for modeling learning. The present paper
introduces a structure for the process {Pt} designed to capture learning about a mem-
oryless mechanism. The process is constructed from a triple of sets (Θ,M0,L).A s i n
the Bayesian case, Θ is a parameter space. The set of priors M0 represents the agent’s
initial view of these parameters. When M0 is not a singleton, it also captures (lack of)
conﬁdence in the information upon which this initial view is based. Finally, a set of
likelihoods L represents the agent’s ap r i o r iview of the connection between signals and
t h et r u ep a r a m e t e r .
The multiplicity of likelihoods and the distinction between Θ and L are central to
the way we model an agent who has modest (or realistic) ambitions about what she can
learn. The set Θ represents features of the environment that the agent views as constant
over time and that she therefore expects to learn. However, in complicated environments
she may be wary of a host of other poorly understood factors that also aﬀect realized
signals. They vary over time in a way that she does not understand well enough even to
theorize about and therefore she does not try to learn about them. The multiplicity of
likelihoods in L captures these factors. Under regularity conditions, we show that beliefs
become concentrated on one parameter value in Θ. However, ambiguity need not vanish
in the long run, since the time-varying unknown features remain impossible to know
even after many observations. Instead, the agent moves towards a state of time-invariant
ambiguity, where she has learned all that she can.1
As a concrete illustration, consider independent tosses of a sequence of coins. If
the decision-maker perceives the coins to be identical, then after many tosses she will
naturally become conﬁdent that the observed empirical frequency of heads is close to
a “true” frequency of heads that is relevant for forecasting future tosses. Thus she
will eventually become conﬁdent enough to view the data as an i.i.d. process. This
laboratory-style situation is captured by the Bayesian model.2
More generally, suppose that she believes the tosses to be independent, but that she
has no reason to be sure that the coins are identical - for example, she might be told
the same about each coin but very little (or nothing at all) about each. Then she would
plausibly admit the possibility that the coins are not identical. In particular, there is no
longer a compelling reason why data in the future should be i.i.d. with frequency of heads
equal to the empirical frequency of heads observed in the past. Indeed, in contrast to a
Bayesian, she may not even be sure whether the empirical frequencies of the data will
1Existing dynamic applications of ambiguity typically impose time-invariant ambiguity. Our model
makes explicit that this can be justiﬁed as the outcome of a learning process. See Epstein and Schneider
[8] for further properties of time invariant ambiguity.
2Under regularity conditions, the posterior µt converges to a Dirac measure on Θ, almost surely under
p, the Bayesian’s subjective probability on sequences of data; see Schervish [21].
3converge, let alone expect her learning process to settle down at a single i.i.d. process.3
This situation cannot be captured by the exchangeable Bayesian model.4 One can view
our model as an attempt to capture learning in such complicated (or vaguely speciﬁed
and poorly understood) environments.
To illustrate our model in an economic setting, we study portfolio choice and asset
market participation by investors who are ambiguity averse and learn over time about
asset returns. Selective participation in asset markets has been shown to be consistent
with optimal static (or myopic) portfolio choice by ambiguity averse investors (Dow and
Werlang [5]). What is new in the present paper is that we solve the — more realistic —
intertemporal problem of an investor who rebalances his portfolio in light of new infor-
mation that aﬀects both beliefs and conﬁdence. A key property of the solution is that an
increase in conﬁdence — captured in our model by a posterior set that shrinks over time
— induces a quantitatively signiﬁcant trend towards stock market market participation
and investment. This is in contrast to Bayesian studies of estimation risk, which tend to
ﬁnd small eﬀects of learning on investment.
Another novel feature of the optimal portfolio is that the investment horizon matters
for asset allocation because investors hedge exposure to an unknown (ambiguous) factor
they are learning about. This hedging of ambiguity is distinct from the familiar hedging
demand driven by intertemporal substitution eﬀects stressed by Merton [17]. Indeed, we
show that it arises even when preferences over risky payoﬀ streams are logarithmic, so
that the traditional hedging demand is zero.
We are aware of only three formal treatments of learning under ambiguity. Mari-
nacci [16] studies repeated sampling with replacement from an Ellsberg urn and shows
that ambiguity is resolved asymptotically. A primary diﬀerence from our model is that
Marinacci assumes a single likelihood. The statistical model proposed by Walley [22, pp.
457-72] diﬀers in details from ours, but is in the same spirit; in particular, it also features
multiple likelihoods. An important diﬀerence, however, is that our model is consistent
with a coherent axiomatic theory of dynamic choice between consumption processes. Ac-
cordingly, it is readily applicable to economic settings. A similar remark applies to Huber
[13], who also points to the desirability of admitting multiple likelihoods and outlines one
proposal for doing so.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a sequence of thought experi-
ments to motivate our model. Section 3 brieﬂy reviews recursive multiple-priors utility
and then introduces the learning model. Section 4 establishes properties of learning in
the short and long run. The portfolio choice application is described in Section 5. Proofs
are collected in the appendix.
3For the exchangeable Bayesian model, convergence of empirical frequencies is a consequence of the
LLN for exchangeable random variables; see Schervish [21].
4If the data are generated by a memoryless mechanism and information about each observation is
ap r i o r ithe same, the exchangeable model is the only relevant Bayesian model. More complicated
Bayesian models that introduce either serial dependence or a dependence of the distribution on calendar
time are not applicable.
42E X A M P L E S
In this section, we consider three related learning scenarios. Each involves urns containing
ﬁve balls that are either black or white; Figure 1 illustrates the composition of the urns.
H o w e v e r ,t h es c e n a r i o sd i ﬀer in a way intended to illustrate alternative hypotheses about
learning in economic environments, and to motivate the main ingredients of our model.
In particular, we highlight intuitive behavior that we show later can be accommodated
by our learning model but not by the Bayesian model.
Scenario 1: Pure risk
An urn contains ﬁve balls. The agent is told that two are black, two are white and
that the ﬁf t hi se i t h e rb l a c ko rw h i t ed e p e n d i n go nt h eo u t c o m eo ft h et o s so fa nu n b i a s e d
coin - the ‘coin ball’ is black if the coin toss produces heads and it is white otherwise.
She cannot see the outcome of the coin toss, but she does observe, every period, a black
or white ball. Her ex ante view is that these data are generated by sampling with
replacement from the given urn. This may be because she is actually doing the sampling,
or because she has been told that this is how signals are generated. Alternatively, it may
simply reﬂect her subjective view of the environment. In any case, the obvious version of
the Bayesian learning model (1) seems appropriate. In particular, she can be conﬁdent
of learning the color of the coin ball.
Scenario 2: Ambiguous prior information about a ﬁxed urn
The information provided about the urn is modiﬁed to: there is at least one non-coin
ball of each color. Thus unlike Scenario 1, no objective probabilities are given for the
composition of the urn — there is ambiguity about the number of black non-coin balls.
H o w e v e r ,s i g n a l sa r ea g a i no b s e r v e di ne a c hp e r i o d ,a n dt h e ya r ev i e w e da sr e s u l t i n g
from sampling with replacement from the given urn. Because the agent views the factors
underlying signals, namely the color composition of the urn, as ﬁxed through time, she
c a nh o p et ol e a r ni t .T h a ti s ,s h ew o u l dt r yt ol e a r nt h et r u ec o m p o s i t i o no ft h ea m b i g u o u s
urn.
Compare this situation with the purely risky one, Scenario 1 above, assuming the
two coin tosses are independent. In particular, consider the choice between betting on
drawing black (white) from the risky urn as opposed to the ambiguous one. (Throughout
a bet on the color of a ball drawn from an urn is understood to pay one util if the ball
has the desired color and zero otherwise.) The Ellsberg Paradox examines this choice
prior to any sampling. As recalled in the introduction, the intuitive behavior pointed to
by Ellsberg - the preference to bet on drawing black from the risky urn as opposed to
the ambiguous one, and a similar preference for white - is inconsistent with a single prior
on the composition of the ambiguous urn.
Consider the ranking of bets after some sampling. It is plausible that Ellsberg-type
behavior persists in the short run:f o ra n ys u ﬃciently short common sample history across
the risky and ambiguous urns, a bet on the risky urn should remain preferrable to an
analogous bet on the ambiguous urn. At the same time, given the ex ante view that
5Figure 1: Urns for Scenarios 1-3.
sampling is from an unchanging urn, it is intuitive that learning should resolve ambiguity
in the long run. Asymptotically the agent should behave as if she knew the fraction
of black balls were equal to their empirical frequency. In the limit, for any common
sample history across the two urns, she should be indiﬀerent between betting on the
next draw from the risky as opposed to the ambiguous urn. Both Scenarios 1 and 2 are
thus conducive to inference and learning because there is one urn with ﬁxed composition.
Next we examine learning in a more complex setting where signals are generated by a
sequence of urns with time-varying composition.
Scenario 3: Unambiguous prior and changing urns
Signals are generated by successive sampling from a sequence of urns, each containing
black and white balls. The urns are perceived in the following way: each urn consists
of a coin ball and four other balls as above. The coin is tossed once at the start and
determines the same color for coin-balls in all urns. However, non-coin balls are replaced
every period with a new set of non-coin balls. This task is performed every period by an
administrator. It is also known that (i) a new administrator is appointed every period,
(ii) no administrator knows the previous history of urns or draws and (iii) the only
restriction on any given administrator is that at least one non-coin ball of each color be
placed in the urn.
Ex ante, before any draws are observed, this environment looks the same as Scenario
2: there is one coin ball, there is at least one black and one white non-coin ball, and there
are two non-coin balls about which there is no information. The new feature in Scenario
3 is that the non-coin balls change over time in a way that is not well understood. What
might an agent now try to learn? Since the coin-ball is ﬁx e da c r o s su r n sa n du n d e r l i e s
all signals, it still makes sense to try to learn its color. At the same time, learning
about the changing sequence of non-coin balls has become more diﬃcult. Compared to
Scenario 2, one would thus expect agents to perceive more uncertainty about the overall
6proportion of black balls. We now argue that this should lead to diﬀerent behavior in
the two scenarios both in the short run and in the long run.
Begin again by considering betting behavior in the short run, assuming that the
coin tosses in Scenarios 2 and 3 are independent. Before any sampling, one should be
indiﬀerent between bets in Scenarios 2 and 3, since the two settings are ap r i o r iidentical.
However, suppose that one black draw from each urn has been observed and consider bets
on the next draw being black. It is intuitive that the agent prefer to bet on black in the
next draw in Scenario 2 rather than on the next draw in Scenario 3. This is because
the observed black draw in Scenario 2 is stronger evidence for the next draw also being
black than is the observed black draw in Scenario 3. In Scenario 3, the agent does not
understand well the dynamics of the non-coin balls and thus is plausibly concerned that
the next urn may contain more white balls than did the ﬁrst. Of course, she thinks
that the next urn may also contain more black balls, but as in the static Ellsberg choice
problem, the more pessimistic possibility outweighs the optimistic one. Thus she would
rather bet in Scenario 2 where the number of black non-coin balls is perceived not to
change between urns.
Turn to behavior in the long run. Scenarios 2 and 3 diﬀer in what qualiﬁes as a
reasonable ap r i o r iview about the convergence of empirical frequencies. Since the urn
in Scenario 2 is essentially ﬁxed, one should be conﬁdent that the fraction of black balls
drawn converges to some limit. In contrast, nothing in the description of Scenario 3
indicates that such convergence will occur. The sequence of administrators suggests only
that the number of black non-coin balls is independent across successive urns. Otherwise,
the description of the environment is very much consistent with perpetual change. It is
thus reasonable to expect ap r i o r ithat nothing can be learned about future non-coin
balls from sampling. Given how little information is provided about any single urn, the
number of non-coin balls should be perceived as ambiguous at all dates. In particular,
even after long identical samples from the two scenarios, one would still prefer to bet on
the next draw being black from the urns in Scenario 2 rather than in Scenario 3.
Desirable Properties of a Learning Model
To sum up, we would like a model that captures the following intuitive choices between
bets in Scenarios 1-3. First, bets on risky urns (Scenario 1) are preferred to bets on
ambiguous urns with ﬁxed composition (Scenario 2) in the short run, but not in the long
run. In other words, with only ambiguous prior information, Ellsberg type behavior is
observed in the short run, but not in the long run. Second, bets on risky urns (Scenario 1)
are preferred to bets on ambiguous urns with changing composition (Scenario 3) in both
the short and long run. In other words, in a complicated environment with changing urns,
Ellsberg type behavior persists. It is clear that the Bayesian model cannot generate these
choices, since it never gives rise to Ellsberg-type behavior. Finally, bets on ambiguous
urns with ﬁx e dc o m p o s i t i o n( S c e n a r i o2 )s h o u l db ep r e f e r r e dt ob e t so na m b i g u o u su r n s
with changing composition (Scenario 3). This third choice emphasizes that the distinction
between ambiguous prior information about a ﬁx e du r na n da m b i g u i t yp e r c e i v e da b o u t
changing urns is behaviorally important.
73A M O D E L O F L E A R N I N G
3.1 Recursive Multiple-Priors
We work with a ﬁnite period state space St = S, identical for all times. One element
st ∈ S is observed every period. At time t, an agent’s information consists of the history
st =( s1,...,st). There is an inﬁnite horizon, so S∞ is the full state space.5 The agent
ranks consumption plans c =( ct),w h e r ect is a function of the history st.A ta n yd a t e
t =0 ,1,..., given the history st, the agent’s ordering is represented by a conditional
utility function Ut,d e ﬁned recursively by
Ut(c;s








where β and u satisfy the usual properties. The set of probability measures Pt(st) models
beliefs about the next observation st+1,g i v e nt h eh i s t o r yst. Such beliefs reﬂect ambiguity
when Pt(st) is a nonsingleton. We refer to {Pt} as the process of conditional one-step-
ahead beliefs. The process of utility functions is determined by speciﬁcation of {Pt}, u(·)
and β, which constitute the primitives of the functional form.
To clarify the connection to the Gilboa-Schmeidler model, it is helpful to rewrite
utility using discounted sums. In a Bayesian model, the set of all conditional-one-step-
ahead probabilities uniquely determine a probability measure over the full state space.
Similarly, the process {Pt} determines a unique set of probability measures P on S∞
satisfying the regularity conditions speciﬁed in Epstein and Schneider [7].6 Thus one
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t ¤
.( 3 )
This expression shows that each conditional ordering conforms to the multiple-priors
model in Gilboa and Schmeidler [12], with the set of priors for time t determined by
updating the set P measure-by-measure via Bayes’ Rule.
Axiomatic foundations for recursive multiple-priors utility are provided in Epstein and
Schneider [7]. The essential axioms are that conditional orderings (i) satisfy the Gilboa-
Schmeidler axioms, (ii) are connected by dynamic consistency, and (iii) do not depend
on unrealized parts of the decision tree - utility given the history st,d e p e n d so n l yo n
consumption in states of the world that can still occur. To ensure such dynamic behavior
in an application, it is suﬃcient to specify beliefs directly via a process of one-step-ahead
conditionals {Pt}. In the case of learning, this approach has additional appeal: because
5In what follows, measures on S∞ are understood to be deﬁned on the product σ-algebra on S∞,a n d
those on any St are understood to be deﬁn e do nt h ep o w e rs e to fSt. While our formalism is expressed
for S ﬁnite, it can be justiﬁed also for suitable metric spaces S but we ignore the technical details needed
to make the sequel rigorous more generally.
6In the inﬁnite horizon case, uniqueness obtains only if P is assumed also to be regular in a sense
deﬁned in Epstein and Schneider [8], generalizing to sets of priors the standard notion of regularity for
a single prior.
8{Pt} describes how an agent’s view of the next state of the world depends on history,
it is a natural vehicle for modeling learning dynamics. The analysis in [7] restricts {Pt}
only by technical regularity conditions. We now proceed to add further restrictions to
capture how the agent responds to data.
3.2 Learning
Our model of learning applies to situations where a decision-maker holds the ap r i o r i
view that data are generated by the same memoryless mechanism every period. This a
priori view also motivates the Bayesian model of learning about an underlying parameter
from conditionally i.i.d. signals.
As in the Bayesian model outlined in the introduction, our starting point is again (a
ﬁnite period state space S and) a parameter space Θ that represents features of the data
the decision-maker tries to learn. To accommodate ambiguity in initial beliefs about
parameters, represent those beliefs by a set M0 of probability measures on Θ.T h e
size of M0 reﬂects the decision-maker’s (lack of) conﬁdence in the prior information on
which initial beliefs are based. A technically convenient assumption is that M0 is weakly
compact;7 this permits us to refer to minima, rather than inﬁma, over M0.
Finally, we adopt a set of likelihoods L - every parameter value θ ∈ Θ is associated
with a set of probability measures
L(·|θ)={ (·|θ):  ∈ L}.
Each   : Θ −→ ∆(S) is a likelihood function, so that θ 7−→  (A | θ) is assumed
measurable for every A ⊂ S. Another convenient technical condition is that L is compact
when viewed as a subset of (∆(S))
Θ (under the product topology). Finally, to avoid the
problem of conditioning on zero probability events, assume that each  (·|θ) has full
support.
Turn to interpretation. The general idea is that the agent perceives the data gener-
ating mechanism as having some unknown features, represented by θ,t h a ta r ec o m m o n
across experiments. Because these features are perceived as common across time or ex-
periments, she can try to learn about them. At the same time, she feels there are other
factors underlying data, represented by L, that are variable across experiments. It is
known that the variable features are determined by a memoryless mechanism — this is
why the set L does not depend on history. It is also known that the relative importance
of the variable features is the same every period, as in the urn example where there are
always four non-coin balls and one coin ball. This is why the set L does not depend on
time. However, the factors modeled by the set L a r ev a r i a b l ea c r o s st i m ei naw a yt h a t
the agent does not understand beyond the limitation imposed by L. In particular, at any
point in time, any element of L might be relevant for generating the next observation.
7More precisely, measures in M0 are deﬁned on the implicit and suppressed σ-algebra B associated
with Θ. Take the latter to be the power set when Θ is ﬁnite. The weak topology is that induced by
bounded and B-measurable real-valued functions on Θ. M0 is weakly compact iﬀ it is weakly closed.
9Accordingly, while she can try to learn the true θ, she has decided that she will not try
to (or is not able to) learn more.
Conditional independence implies that past signals st aﬀect beliefs about future sig-
nals (such as st+1) only to the extent that they aﬀect beliefs about the parameter. Let
Mt (st), to be described below, denote the set of posterior beliefs about θ given that the
sample st has been observed. The dynamics of learning can again be summarized by a
process of one-step-ahead conditional beliefs. However, in contrast to the Bayesian case

















This process enters the speciﬁcation of recursive multiple priors preferences (2).8
Updating and reevaluation
To complete the description of the model, it remains to describe the evolution of the
posterior beliefs Mt. Imagine a decision-maker at time t looking back at the sample
st. In general, she views both her prior information and the sequence of signals as
ambiguous. As a result, she will typically entertain a number of diﬀerent theories about
how the sample was generated. A theory is a pair (µ0,  t),w h e r eµ0 is a prior belief on
Θ and  t =(  1,..,  t) ∈ Lt is a sequence of likelihoods. The decision-maker contemplates
diﬀerent sequences  t because she is not conﬁdent that signals are identically distributed
over time.
We allow for diﬀerent attitude towards past and future signals. On the one hand, L
is the set of likelihoods possible in the future. Since the decision-maker has decided she
cannot learn the true sequence of likelihoods, it is natural that beliefs about the future
be based on the whole set L as in (4). On the other hand, the decision-maker may
reevaluate, with hindsight, her views about what sequence of likelihoods was relevant
for generating data in the past. Such revision is possible because the agent learns more
about θ and this might make certain theories more or less plausible. For example, some
interpretation of the signals, reﬂected in a certain sequence  t =(  1,..., t), or some prior
experience, reﬂected in a certain prior µ0 ∈ M0,m i g h ta p p e a rn o tv e r yr e l e v a n ti fi ti s
part of a theory that does not explain the data well.
To formalize reevaluation, we need two preliminary steps. First, how well a theory





8Given compactness of M0 and L, one can show that Mt(st) deﬁned below is also compact, and
subsequently that each Pt(st) is compact. This justiﬁes the use of minima in (2).
10Here conditional independence implies that the conditional distribution given θ is simply
the product of the likelihoods  j. Prior information is taken into account by integrating
out the parameter using the prior µ0. The higher the data density, the better is the
observed sample st explained by the theory (µ0,  t). Second, let µt (· ;st,µ 0,  t) denote
the posterior derived from the theory (µ0,  t) by Bayes’ Rule given the data st.T h i s
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Reevaluation takes the form of a likelihood-ratio test. The decision-maker discards
all theories (µ0,  t) that do not pass a likelihood-ratio test against an alternative theory
that puts maximum likelihood on the sample. Posteriors are formed only for theories





















j=1˜  j (sj|θ)d˜ µ0}.
Here α is a parameter, 0 <α≤ 1, that governs the extent to which the decision-maker
is willing to reevaluate her views about how past data were generated in the light of new
sample information. The likelihood-ratio test is more stringent and the set of posteriors
smaller, the greater is α. In the extreme case α =1 , only parameters that achieve
the maximum likelihood are permitted. If the maximum likelihood estimator is unique,
ambiguity about parameters is resolved as soon as the ﬁrst signal is observed. More
g e n e r a l l y ,w eh a v et h a tα>α 0 implies Mα
t ⊂ Mα0
t . It is important that the test is
done after every history. In particular, a theory that was disregarded at time t might
look more plausible at a later time and posteriors based on it may again be taken into
account.
In summary, our model of learning about an ambiguous memoryless mechanism is
given by the tuple (Θ,M0,L,α). As described, the latter induces, or represents,t h e









t is given by (6). The model reduces to the Bayesian model when both the set
of priors and the set of likelihoods have only a single element.
Another important special case occurs if M0 consists of several Dirac measures on
the parameter space in which case there is a simple interpretation of the updating rule:
Mα
t contains all ˜ θ’s such that the hypothesis θ = ˜ θ is not rejected by an asymptotic
likelihood ratio test performed with the given sample, where the critical value of the
χ2 (1) distribution is −2logα.S i n c eα>0, (Dirac measures over) parameter values are
11discarded or added to the set, and Pt varies over time. The Dirac priors speciﬁcation is
convenient for applications — it will be used in our portfolio choice example below. Indeed,
one may wonder whether there is a need for non-Dirac priors at all. However, more general
priors provide a useful way to incorporate objective probabilities, as illustrated by the
scenarios in Section 2.9
3.3 Scenarios Revisited
We now describe how we would model the three scenarios of Section 2 and we show
that our setup can accommodate the intuitive behavior described there. The results here
clarify the role of multiple priors and multiple likelihoods, but are essentially independent
of the revaluation parameter α.W er e t u r nt ot h er o l eo fα in Section 4, where we consider
the evolution of beliefs in the context of Scenario 3.
Scenarios 1 & 2: For both scenarios, specify S = {B,W} and Θ =
©
n
5 : n =1 ,2,3,4
ª
.
The state s corresponds to the color of a drawn ball, and θ indicates the proportion
of black balls (coin or non-coin). For scenario 1, assume that there is a single prior
with µ(θ)=1
3 for θ = 2
5, 3
5 or 4
5 and deﬁne the single likelihood by  (B | θ)=θ.F o r
scenario 2, specify a representation (Θ,M0,L,α) by setting L ={ }, ﬁxing a revaluation
parameter α and deﬁning the set M0 of priors on Θ as follows. Let P ⊂ ∆({1,2,3})
denote beliefs about the number of black non-coin balls. Since the coin-ball and other




2p(5θ − 1) + 1
2p(5θ) (7)
for some p ∈ P.T h u sl e tM0 = {µ
p
0 : p ∈ P}.
This setup captures Ellsberg-type behavior in the short run, because the set of one-
step-ahead probabilities for the next draw is nondegenerate. For example, a bet on black
in Scenario 2 would be evaluated under a prior that puts the lowest possible conditional
probability on a black draw, and similarly for white. As a result, either bet in Scenario 2
will be inferior to its counterpart in Scenario 1. In addition, keeping the history of draws
the same across scenarios, any diﬀerence in utility would become smaller and smaller over
time. With a single likelihood, it is easy to verify that the posteriors derived from M0
become more similar over time and eventually become concentrated on a single parameter
value. Ambiguity is thus resolved in the long run.
Scenario 3. A natural parameter space here is Θ = {B,W}, corresponding to the two






prior on Θ cor-
responding to the toss of the unbiased coin. Ambiguity perceived about the changing
non-coin balls is captured by a nondegenerate set of likelihoods, speciﬁed as follows. Let
P ⊂ ∆({1,2,3}) denote beliefs about the number of black non-coin balls, where P is
the same set used in Scenario 2.S i n c et h eﬁrst urns in the two scenarios are identical, it
9Another example is in Epstein and Schneider [9], where a representation with a single prior and
α =0is used to model the distinction between tangible (well-measured, probabilistic) and intangible
(ambiguous) information.
12is natural to use the same set P to describe beliefs about them. Moreover, though the
urns diﬀer along the sequence in Scenario 3, successive urns are indistinguishable, which
explains why P can be used also to describe the second urn in the present scenario. Each
p in P suggests one likelihood function via
 









L = { 
p : p ∈ P}. (9)
O u rm o d e lo fS c e n a r i o3a l s ol e a d st oan o n d e g e n e r a t es e to fo n e - s t e p - a h e a dc o n d i -
tionals in the short run. The diﬀerence from Scenario 2 is that ambiguity enters through
beliefs about signals, captured by multiple likelihoods, rather than through multiple
priors on Θ. The multiplicity of likelihoods also implies directly that ambiguity never
vanishes. Indeed, a bet on black in Scenario 3 will always be evaluated under a likelihood
that puts the lowest possible conditional probability on a black draw, and similarly for
white. Either bet in Scenario 3 will thus be inferior to its counterpart in Scenario 1, even
in the long run.
Focus now on the other choice described above - given that one black ball has been
drawn, would you rather bet on the next draw being black in Scenario 2 or in Scenario
3? This question highlights one diﬀerence between learning in simple settings (Scenario
2) as opposed to complex ones (Scenario 3), and thus demonstrates the key role played
by multiple-likelihoods. We argued above that it is intuitive that one prefer to bet in
Scenario 2 - the black draw is stronger evidence there for the next draw also being black.
The appendix shows that our model predicts these intuitive choices. In particular, it
demonstrates that the minimal predictive probability for a black ball conditional on
observing a black ball,
min





 (B | θ)dµ1(θ),
is smaller under Scenario 3 than under Scenario 2. An ambiguity averse agent who ranks
bets according to the smallest probability of winning will thus prefer to bet on the urn
from Scenario 2.
10Given the symmetry of the environment, a natural candidate for P is
P  = {p ∈ ∆({1,2,3}): Σλp(λ) ∈ [2 −  ,2+ ]},
where   is a parameter, 0 ≤   ≤ 1. In the special case where   =1 , the agent attaches equal weight to all
logically possible urn compositions λ =1 , 2, or 3. More generally, P  incorporates a subjective element
into the speciﬁcation. Just as subjective expected utility theory does not impose connections between
the Bayesian prior and objective features of the environment, so too the set of likelihoods is subjective
(varies with the agent) and is not uniquely determined by the facts. For example, for  <1, the agent
attaches more weight to the ‘focal’ likelihood corresponding to λ =2as opposed to the more extreme
scenarios λ =1 ,3.
133.4 Discussion
Two further remarks are in order about the structure of our model and its relationship
to the Bayesian model. Consider ﬁrst the question of foundations. Though recursive
multiple-priors is an axiomatic model, we do not have axiomatic foundations for the
specialization described here. For the Bayesian model, the de Finetti Theorem shows
that the representation (1) is possible if and only if the prior p on S∞ is exchangeable.
We are missing a counterpart of the de Finetti Theorem for our setting. Nevertheless,
without discounting the importance of this missing element, we would argue that our
model can be justiﬁed on the less formal grounds of cognitive plausibility.
Begin with a perspective on the de Finetti Theorem. While de Finetti starts from
ap r i o rp on S∞ and the assumption of exchangeability, the usefulness of his theorem
stems in large part from the reverse perspective: it describes a cognitively plausible
p r o c e d u r ef o rad e c i s i o n - m a k e rt oa r r i v ea tap r i o rp and to determine thereby if, indeed,
exchangeability is acceptable.11 In some settings, there is a natural pair (Θ, ) and, when
Θ is simple, forming a prior µ0 over Θ is easier than forming one directly over S∞.T h u s
the representation (1) can be viewed as providing a procedure for the decision-maker to
arrive at the measure p on S∞ to use for decision-making. Moreover, to the extent that
(Θ, ) is simple and natural given the environment, the procedure is cognitively plausible.
In fact, cognitive plausibility is essential to support the typical application of the
Bayesian model. After all, a Bayesian modeler must assume a particular parametric
speciﬁcation for (Θ,µ 0, ). This amounts, via (1), to assuming a particular prior p for
which there is no axiomatic justiﬁcation. Instead, cognitive plausibility is the only sup-
porting argument. However, outside of contrived settings, where the data generating
mechanism is simple and transparent, the existence of a cognitively plausible speciﬁca-
tion of (Θ,µ 0, ) is problematic. In particular, the Bayesian model presumes a degree of
conﬁdence on the part of the agent that seems unintuitive in complicated environments.
We view enhanced cognitive plausibility as a justiﬁcation for our model. As illustrated
by the examples and the way in which we model them, greater cognitive plausibility is
aﬀorded if we allow the decision-maker to have multiple priors on the parameter space
Θ and, more importantly, multiple likelihoods.
A second feature of our model — and one that it shares with the Bayesian approach —
is that the decomposition between learnable and unlearnable features of the environment
is exogenous. Indeed, the learnable parameters Θ and the unlearnable features embodied
by a nonsingleton L are given at the outset. We thus do not explain which features
the agent tries to learn in any given setting. The same is true in the Bayesian case,
where the decomposition is extreme - L is a singleton and the agent tries to identify
an i.i.d. process. Thus, while we leave important aspects unmodeled, we do extend the
Bayesian model in the direction of permitting more plausible ambitions about what can
be learned in complex settings. The Ellsberg-style examples and the portfolio choice
application illustrate that natural decompositions may be suggested by descriptions of
11See, for example, Kreps [14, pp. 155-6].
14the environment.
4 BELIEF DYNAMICS
In this section we illustrate further properties of learning under ambiguity. We ﬁrst
examine the dynamics of beliefs and conﬁdence in the short term, using the example of
Scenario 3. We then provide a general result on convergence of the learning process in
the long run.
4.1 Inference from Small Samples






, and assume further that the agent
weighs equally all the logically possible combinations of non-coin balls, that is, L is given
by (8) with
P = {p ∈ ∆({1,2,3}): Σλp(λ) ∈ [1,3]}
The evolution of the posterior set Mα
t in (6) shows how signals tend to induce ambiguity
about parameters even where there is no ambiguity ex ante (singleton Mα
0). This happens
w h e nt h ea g e n tv i e w ss o m ea s p e c t so ft h ed a t ag e n e r a t i n gm e c h a n i s ma st o od i ﬃcult to
try to learn, as modeled by a nonsingleton set of likelihoods. More generally, Mα
t can
expand or shrink depending on the signal realization.








Figure 2 depicts the evolution of beliefs about the coin-ball being black as more balls
are drawn. The top panel shows the evolution of the posterior interval for a sequence
of draws such that the number of black balls is 3t
5 ,f o rt =5 ,10,....Intervals are shown
for α = .1 and α = .001,a sw e l la sf o rα =0 , to illustrate what would happen without
revaluation. In addition, a single line is drawn for the case α =1 , where the interval is
degenerate. For example, after the ﬁrst 5 signals, with 3 black balls drawn, the agent
with α = .1 assigns a posterior probability between .4 and .8 to the coin ball being black.
What happens if the same sample is observed again? Our model captures two eﬀects.
First, a larger batch of signals permits more possible interpretations of past signals. For
example, having seen ten draws, the agent may believe that all six black draws came
about although each time there were the “most adverse” conditions, that is, all but one
non-coin ball was white. This interpretation strongly suggests that the coin ball itself
is black. The argument also becomes stronger the more data are available - after only
ﬁve draws, the appearance of three black balls under “adverse” conditions is not as
remarkable.
Second, even though it is not possible to learn about future non-coin balls, past draws
are informative about past non-coin balls, not just about the parameter. To illustrate,
15suppose 50 draws have been observed, and that 30 of them have been black. Given a
theory about the non-coin balls, these observations suggest that the coin ball is more
likely to be black than white. At the same time, given a value of the parameter, the
observations suggest that more than half of the past urns contained three black non-
coin balls. Sensible updating takes the latter feature into account. In our model, this
is accommodated by revaluation. The evolution of conﬁdence, measured by the size of
the posterior interval, then depends on how much agents reevaluate their views. For an
agent with α = .001, the posterior interval expands between t =5and t =2 0 .I nt h i s
sense, a sample of ten or twenty signals induces more ambiguity than a sample of ﬁve.
However, reevaluation implies that large enough batches of signals induce less ambiguity
than smaller ones.
The lower panel of Figure 2 tracks the evolution of posterior intervals along one
particular sample. Black balls were drawn at dates indicated by vertical lines, while
white balls were drawn at the other dates. Taking the width of the interval as a measure,
the extent of ambiguity is seen to respond to data. In particular, a phase of many black
draws (periods 5-11, for example) shrinks the posterior interval, while an ‘outlier’ (the
white ball drawn in period 12) makes it expand again. This behavior is reminiscent of
the evolution of the Bayesian posterior variance, which is also maximal if the fraction of
black balls is one half.
4.2 Beliefs in the Long Run
Turn now to behavior after a large number of draws. As discussed above, our model
describes agents who are not sure whether empirical frequencies will converge. Never-
theless, it is useful to derive limiting beliefs for the case when such convergence occurs:
the limiting beliefs also approximately describe behavior after a large, but ﬁnite, number
of draws. Therefore, they characterize behavior in the long run. The limiting result
below holds with probability one under a true data-generating process, described by a
probability P∗ on S∞. For this process, we require only that the empirical frequencies
of each of the ﬁnite number of states s ∈ S converge, almost surely under P∗.I nw h a t
follows, these limiting frequencies are described by a measure φ on S.
By analogy with the Bayesian case, the natural candidate parameter value on which
posteriors might become concentrated maximizes the data density of an inﬁnite sample.
With multiple likelihoods, any data density depends on the sequence of likelihoods that is
u s e d .I nw h a tf o l l o w s ,i ti ss u ﬃcient to focus on sequences such that the same likelihood
is used whenever state s is realized. A likelihood sequence can then be represented by a
collection ( s)s∈S. Accordingly, deﬁne the log data density after maximization over the
likelihood sequence by




φ(s)log s (s|θ). (10)
The following result (proven in the appendix) summarizes the behavior of the posterior
set in the long run.





















Figure 2: The Posterior Interval is the range of posterior probability that the coin ball is black,
µt (B). In the top panel, the sample is selected to keep fraction of black balls constant. In the
bottom panel, vertical lines indicate black balls drawn.
Theorem 1 Suppose that Θ is ﬁnite and that:
(i) θ
∗ =a r gm a x θ H (θ) is a singleton;






∗) > 0 for some µ0 in Mα
0.
Then every sequence of posteriors from Mα
t converges to the Dirac measure δθ∗,a l m o s t
surely under the true probability P∗, and the convergence is uniform, that is, there is a
set Ω ⊂ S∞ with P∗ (Ω)=1a n ds u c ht h a tf o re v e r ys∞ in Ω,
µt (θ
∗) → 1
uniformly over all sequences of posteriors {µt} satisfying µt ∈ Mα
t (st) for all t.
Condition (i) is an identiﬁcation condition: it says that there is at least one sequence
of likelihoods (that is, the maximum likelihood sequence), such that the sample with
empirical frequency measure φ can be used to distinguish θ
∗ from any other parameter
17value. Condition (ii) is satisﬁed if every prior in Mα
0 assigns positive probability to θ
∗
(because Mα
0 is weakly compact). The weaker condition stated accommodates also the
case where all priors are Dirac measures (including speciﬁcally the Dirac concentrated
at θ
∗), as well as the case of a single prior containing θ
∗ in its support. (In Scenario 3,
(ii) is satisﬁed for any set of priors where the probability of a black coin ball is bounded
away from zero.)
Under conditions (i) and (ii),a n di fΘ is ﬁnite, then in the long run only the maximum
likelihood sequence is permissible and the set of posteriors converges to a singleton. The
agent thus resolves any ambiguity about factors that aﬀect all signals, captured by θ.A t
the same time, ambiguity about future realizations st does not vanish. Instead, beliefs
in the long run become close to L(·|θ
∗). The learning process settles down in a state of
time-invariant ambiguity.
The asserted uniform convergence is important in order that convergence of beliefs
translate into long-run properties of preference. Thus it implies that for the process of




























f (st+1)d (st+1 | θ
∗),
for any f : St+1 → R1 describing a one-step-ahead prospect (in utility units). In par-
ticular, this translates directly into the utility of consumption processes for which all
uncertainty is resolved next period.
As a concrete example, consider long run beliefs about the urns in Scenario 3. Let
φ∞ denote the limiting frequency of black balls. Suppose also that beliefs are given by


















The ﬁrst term captures all observed black balls and is therefore maximized by assuming
λB =3black non-coin balls. Similarly, the likelihood of white draws is maximized by
setting λW =1 . It follows that the identiﬁcation condition is satisﬁed except in the knife-
edge case φ∞ = 1
2.M o r e o v e r ,θ
∗ = B if and only if φ∞ > 1
2. Thus the theorem implies
that an agent who observes a large number of draws with a fraction of black balls above
one half believes it very likely that the color of the coin ball is black. The role of α is
18only to regulate the speed of convergence to this limit. This dependence is also apparent
from the dynamics of the posterior intervals in Figure 2.
The example also illustrates the role of the likelihood ratio test (6) in ensuring learn-
ability of the representation. Suppose that φ∞ = 3
5. The limiting frequency of 3
5 black
draws could be realized either because there is a black coin ball and on average one half
of the non-coin balls were black, or because the coin ball is white and all of the urns
contained 3 black non-coin balls. If α were equal to zero, both possibilities would be
taken equally seriously and the limiting posterior set would contain Dirac measures that
place probability one on either θ = B or θ = W. This pattern is apparent from Figure
2. In contrast, with α>0, reevaluation eliminates the sequence where all urns contain
three black non-coin balls as unlikely.
The set of “true” processes P∗ f o rw h i c ht h et h e o r e mh o l d si sl a r g e .L i k eaB a y e s i a n
who is sure the data are exchangeable, the agent described by the theorem is convinced
that the data generating process is memoryless. As a result, learning is driven only by the
empirical frequencies of the one-dimensional events, or subsets of S. Given any process
for which those frequencies converge to a given limit, the agent will behave in the same
way. Of course, in applications one would typically consider a “truth” that is memoryless.
Like the exchangeable Bayesian model, our model is best applied to situations where the
agent is correct in his ap r i o r ijudgement that the data generating process is memoryless.
Importantly, a memoryless process for which empirical frequencies converge need not be
i.i.d. There exists a large class of serially independent, but nonstationary, processes for
which empirical frequencies converge.12 In fact, there is a large class of such processes
that cannot be distinguished from an i.i.d. process with distribution φ on the basis of any
ﬁnite sample. Thus even if they are convinced that the empirical frequencies converge,
a concern with ongoing change may lead agents to never be conﬁdent that they have
identiﬁed a “true” i.i.d. data generating process with distribution φ.13
Incomplete learning can occur also in a Bayesian model. For example, if the true data
generating measure is not absolutely continuous with respect to an agent’s belief, vio-
lating the Blackwell-Dubins [2] conditions, then beliefs may not converge to the truth.14
However, even then the Bayesian agent believes, and behaves as if, they will. In contrast,
agents in our model are aware of the presence of hard-to-describe factors that prevent
learning and their actions reﬂect the residual uncertainty.
Incomplete learning occurs also in models with persistent hidden state variables, such
as regime switching models. Here learning about the state variable never ceases because
agents are sure that the state variable is forever changing. The distribution of these
regime changes is known a priori. Agents thus track a known data generating process that
is not memoryless. In contrast, our model applies to memoryless mechanisms and learning
is about a ﬁxed true parameter. Nevertheless, because of ambiguity, the agent reaches
12See Nielsen [18] for a broad class of examples.
13As discussed earlier, they may also reach this view because they are not sure whether the empirical
frequencies converge in the ﬁrst place.
14As a simple example, if the parameter governing a memoryless mechanism were outside the support
of the agent’s prior, the agent could obviously never learn the true parameter.
19a state where no further learning is possible although the data generating mechanism is
not yet understood completely.
5 DYNAMIC PORTFOLIO CHOICE
In this section, we illustrate the economic consequences of learning under ambiguity by
solving the intertemporal portfolio choice problem of an investor who learns about the
equity premium. Suppose the investor believes that the equity premium is ﬁxed, but
unknown, so that it must be estimated from past returns. Intuitively, one would expect
the investor to become more conﬁdent in his estimate as more returns are observed. As
a result, a given estimate should lead to a higher portfolio weight on stocks, the more
data was used to form the estimate.
Bayesian analysis has tried to capture the above intuition by incorporating estimation
risk into portfolio problems. One might expect that that the weight on stocks increases
as the posterior variance of the equity premium declines through Bayesian learning.
However, the eﬀects of estimation risk on portfolio choice tend to be quantitatively small
or even zero (see, for example, the survey by Brandt [3]). In fact, in a classic continuous
time version of the problem, where an investor with log utility learns about the drift in
stock prices, there is no trend in stock investment whatsoever: portfolio weights depend
only on the posterior mean, not on the variance (Feldman [11]). The Bayesian investor
thus behaves exactly as if the estimate were known to be correct.
Below we revisit the classic log investor problem. We argue that the Bayesian model
generates a counterintuitive result because a declining posterior variance does not ad-
equately capture changes in conﬁdence. In contrast, when returns are perceived to be
ambiguous, an increase in investor conﬁdence — captured in our model by a shrinking
set of posterior beliefs — naturally induces a trend toward stock ownership. This trend is
quantitatively signiﬁcant at plausible parameter values. To apply the ﬁnite state frame-
work of Section 3.2, we work in a binomial tree setting. However, most results are stated
for the continuous time limit of the model. This permits closed-form solutions for beliefs
and makes the results more easily comparable to existing work on Bayesian learning.
Investor Problem
We measure time in months and assume that there are k trading periods in every
month. An investor has access to a riskless asset with constant per period interest rate
Rf = erf/k and to stocks with uncertain return R(st)=er(st).T h e s t a t e st takes one
of two values every period: st ∈ {0,1}. The investor knows the possible (log) return
realizations r(1) = σ/
√
k and r(0) = −σ/
√
k, but is not sure about the probability π of
the high state st =1 , and hence the monthly mean log return
µ(π): =( 2 π − 1)σ
√
k.
An investor at the end of month t plans over the next T months; she cares about terminal
wealth according to the utility function VT (Wt+T)=l o gWt+T.S h e m a y r e b a l a n c e h e r
20portfolio in every trading period between t and T.A tt i m et, she knows that rebalancing
may be optimal in the future — for example, if learning changes beliefs and conﬁdence —
and thus takes the prospect of future learning and rebalancing into account when choosing
a portfolio at t. We are interested in how the optimal portfolio weight on stocks changes
with calendar time t and the investment horizon T.
While calendar time is measured in months, beliefs and the value function are deﬁned
for every trading period. The history of state realizations up to trading period τ = t+j/k
—t h ejth trading period in month t +1— can be summarized by the fraction φτ of high
states observed up to τ. Given one-step-ahead beliefs Pτ (sτ), the value function of the
log investor takes the form Vτ (Wτ,s τ)=hτ (φτ)+l o gWτ. The process {hτ} solves















































where we have used the minimax theorem to reverse the order of optimization.
Denote by p∗
t (φt) the minimizing (conditional-one-step-ahead) probability. As k be-





t (φt)) + 1
2σ2 − rf
σ2 .( 1 2 )
This weight is also optimal in a continuous time problem when cumulative returns follow
a geometric Brownian motion with volatility σ and drift µ(p∗
t (φt)) at date t.15
We calibrate the model to monthly real US stock returns. We would like to compute
the optimal portfolio of an investor who has seen a monthly sample of log returns {rτ}
t
τ=1
taken from the data. Since agents in the model observe binary returns {R(sτ)} per
trading period, we construct a sample of tk realizations of R(sτ) such that the implied
empirical distribution of monthly log returns is close to that in the data. Fix σ =
1 √
1219.0%, the sample standard devation of monthly log returns from 1926 to 2004.16
The sample of states can be summarized by the fraction φt, which we determine by
matching the means in the two samples, that is µ(φt)=¯ rt := 1
tΣt
j=1rj. Standard results






converges to a normal distribution with mean ¯ rt and variance σ2.W ea l s o
set the riskless rate constant at 2% per year.
Bayesian Benchmark
As a Bayesian benchmark, we assume that the investor has an improper beta prior
over the probability π of the high state, so that the posterior mean of π after t months
(or tk state realizations) is equal to φt, the maximum likelihood estimator of π.T h e
15Let cumulative stock returns follow
dV (t)
V (t) = µ(t)dt + σdB(t),w h e r eB is a standard Brownian
motion. If µ(t)=µ(p∗
t(φt)), then (12) is the optimal weight of a log investor at date t.
16We use the monthly NYSE-AMEX return from CRSP, net of monthly CPI inﬂation for all urban
consumers, for 1926:1 to 2004:12.
21Bayesian’s probability of a high state next period is then also given by φt.T h eo p t i m a l
portfolio weight for large k is given by (12) with µ(p∗
t (φt)) = µ(φt)=¯ rt. This weight —
denoted ω
bay
t in what follows — is also optimal for a continuous time investor who learns
about the drift of cumulative returns, starting from an improper normal prior.
The benchmark clariﬁes the limitation of the Bayesian model in capturing conﬁdence.
In the binomial tree, the optimal portfolio weight of the log investor depends only on
the estimate φt, regardless of how many observations it is based on. Similarly, in the
continuous time limit, the optimal portfolio weight depends only on the sample mean ¯ rt.
This happens despite the fact that estimation risk is gradually reduced as the posterior
variance — here σ2/t — shrinks. Intuitively, estimation risk perceived by a Bayesian is
second order relative to the risk in unexpected returns. In the continuous time limit,
estimation risk vanishes altogether.17
Trends in stock investment can occur in the Bayesian case if the investment horizon
T is long and the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is diﬀerent from one.18 However,
the eﬀect of calendar time on the portfolio weight is then due to intertemporal hedging
of future news, as emphasized by Brennan [4]. It does not occur because the resolution
of risk makes risk averse agents more conﬁdent. Indeed, if the coeﬃcient of relative risk
aversion is less than one, learning induces a decreasing trend in the optimal portfolio
weight, although the investor is risk averse. Moreover, while high risk aversion can
generate an increasing trend, the eﬀect is quantitatively small in our setting, as we show
below.
Beliefs under Ambiguity
Beliefs under ambiguity are given by a representation (Θ,M0,L,α). The ambiguity
averse investor perceives the mean monthly log return as θ + λt,w h e r eθ ∈ Θ := R is
ﬁx e da n dc a nb el e a r n e d ,w h i l eλt is driven by many poorly understood factors driving











,f o r s o m e λ with |λ| < ¯ λ. (13)
If λ>0, returns are ambiguous even conditional on the parameter θ and λt parametrizes
the likelihood  t. For ﬁxed θ and λ,a n dk large, the implied cumulative stock return
process approximates a diﬀusion with volatility σ and drift µ( (1|θ)) = θ + λ.
17In discrete time, esimtaion risk would induce a small trend eﬀect. Maintaining a diﬀuse prior and
normality, the one-period-ahead conditional variance of log returns at date t would be σ2+σ2/t.W i t ha
period length of one month, the eﬀect of estimation risk becomes a small fraction of the overall perceived
variance after only a couple of years.
18It follows from results in Rogers [19] that the optimal weight on stocks for a Bayesian investor with
power utility and coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion γ is given by
ωt =




γt+( γ − 1)T
.
The ﬁrst fraction is the “myopic demand” that obtains for T =0 ; it depends only on the posterior mean.
For T>0, the second fraction captures intertemoporal hedging. For positive equity premia, the weight
decreases (increases) relative to the myopic demand with calendar time t if γ is smaller (larger) than 1.
22The set of priors M0 on Θ is given by all the Dirac measures. For simplicity, we
write θ ∈ Mα
t (st) if the Dirac measure on θ is included in the posterior set at the end of
















−2logα. The posterior set is thus an interval centered around the sample
mean ¯ rt that is wider the larger is the standard error t−1
2σ and the smaller is the parameter
α; in the Bayesian case, α =1and bα =0 . The set of one-step-ahead beliefs Pt (st) —
deﬁned generally in (4) — here contains all likelihoods of the type (13) for some θ ∈
Mα
t (st) and |λ| < ¯ λ.F o rk large, it describes returns as diﬀusions with volatility σ and
an interval of drifts for date t given by
[¯ rt − ¯ λ − t
−1
2σbα, ¯ rt + ¯ λ + t
−1
2σbα].
I nt h el o n gr u n ,t h i si n t e r v a ls h r i n k st o[¯ r − ¯ λ, ¯ r + ¯ λ] so that the equity premium is
perceived to lie in an interval of width 2¯ λ.
The explicit form of the posterior set and limiting beliefs suggests an intuitive way
for an investor to pick the new parameters ¯ λ and α.F i r s t ,s h e c a n p i c k¯ λ by taking a
stand on what she expects to learn in the long run. If she is sure today that she will
eventually know what the equity premium is, she can pick ¯ λ =0 . More generally, she
might believe that even far in the future there will be poorly understood factors that
preclude full conﬁdence in any estimate of the equity premium. She can then quantify
her lack of conﬁdence by specifying how large the range of possible equity premia — which
has width 2¯ λ — will remain in the long run. In the calculations below, we consider both
¯ λ =0and ¯ λ = .001; the latter corresponds to a 2.4 percent range for the (annualized)
expected equity premium.
Second, the decision maker can pick the parameter α by linking the speed of updating
to classical statistics. The posterior set (14) contains all parameters θ
∗ such that the
hypothesis θ = θ
∗ is not rejected by an asymptotic likelihood ratio test where the critical
value of the χ2 (1) distribution is b2
α = −2logα.C h o o s i n g α is therefore the same as
c h o o s i n gas i g n i ﬁcance level, at which a theory must be rejected in order to be excluded
from the belief set. We also choose α to correspond to 5% and 2.5% signiﬁcance levels of
the likelihood ratio test: the values are α = .15 or (bα =1 .96)a n dα = .08 (or bα =2 .23),
respectively. The lower the signiﬁcance level, the fewer theories are rejected for any given
sample; in other words, conﬁdence in understanding the environment is lower. If α =1
and ¯ λ =0 , the posterior set contains only ¯ rt and Pt (st) contains only the Bayesian
benchmark belief.
Optimal portfolios
Learning under ambiguity aﬀects portfolio choice in two ways. The ﬁrst is a direct
eﬀect of beliefs and conﬁdence on the optimal weight which is relevant at any investment
































































A myopic ambiguity averse investor goes long in stocks only if the equity premium is
unambiguously positive. The optimal position is then given by the ﬁrst term in (15). It
depends on the sample through the Bayesian position ω
bay
t : conditional on participation,
the optimal response to news is therefore the same in the two models.
However, ambiguity also introduces a trend component: conditional on participation,
the optimal position increases as conﬁdence grows and the standard error t−1
2σ falls.
While it moves closer to the Bayesian position ω
bay
t in the long run, the optimal position
remains forever smaller when there are multiple likelihoods (¯ λ>0). The second term in
(15) reﬂects short selling when the equity premium is unambiguously negative. Nonpar-
ticipation is optimal if the ML estimate of the equity premium is small in absolute value
so that both terms are zero, that is, if |¯ rt + 1
2σ2 − rf| < ¯ λ + t−1
2σbα.
The second eﬀect of learning under ambiguity is a new intertemporal hedging motive
that induces more participation as the investment horizon becomes longer. Figure 3
compares myopic and long horizon investors by plotting optimal positions against the
maximum likelihood estimate of the (annualized) equity premium (¯ rt + 1
2σ2 − rf)×12.
We consider two long horizon investors, both with an investment horizon of T =1 0years:
the dashed line is for an investor who has seen t = 35 years of data, while the dotted line
is for an investor who has seen t =5years of data. Thick gray lines indicate optimal
myopic positions, which are zero whenever they do not coincide with the long horizon
optimal position. The solid line shows a Bayesian log investor, whose position depends
neither on experience nor on the investment horizon.
For multiple-priors investors, the myopic and long horizon positions coincide if the
equity premium is either high or low enough so that the myopic investor participates.
However, for intermediate estimates of the premium, the myopic investor stays out of
the stock market, while the long horizon investor takes “contrarian” positions: she goes
short in stocks for positive equity premia, but long for negative premia. For the relatively
experienced investor (dashed line), who has seen 35 years of data, horizon eﬀects are small.
However, for an inexperienced investor (dotted line), who has a wide nonparticipation
region if she is myopic, there can be sizeable diﬀerences between the optimal myopic and
the optimal long horizon weights. For example, if the ﬁrst 5 years of data deliver a very
bad sample equity premium of −15%, the long horizon investor does not stay out, but
instead invests close to 30% of wealth in stocks.
Intuitively, contrarian behavior can be optimal for long horizon investors because it
provides a hedge against adverse outcomes of future learning under ambiguity. To see
this, consider ﬁrst how returns aﬀect the continuation utility of myopic and long horizon
24investors diﬀerently. To a myopic investor, stock returns over the next trading period
matter only because they aﬀect future wealth. In contrast, a learning nonmyopic investor
perceives returns also as a signal about the long run equity premium. For example, high
returns suggest that the long run equity premium is higher than previously expected. As
illustrated by the Bellman equation (11), returns matter to a nonmyopic investor in part
because they aﬀect future learning, as summarized by the dependence of continuation
utility on φt+1/k.
In particular, continuation utility is U-shaped in φ, or, equivalently, in the sample
equity premium: multiple priors investors are better oﬀ, the further away the sample
equity premium is from zero. This is because they believe that they can make a proﬁti n
the stock market only if the equity premium is unambiguously diﬀerent from zero, either
on the positive or on the negative side. Suppose now that the ML estimate of the equity
premium is negative. A myopic investor will not take a long position, since the worst
case mean return is negative. While this is also of concern to the nonmyopic investor,
the latter beneﬁts in addition from the fact that the long position pays oﬀ precisely when
continutation utility is low. Indeed, a long position pays oﬀ more when returns are high
and thus when the estimate of the long run equity premium moves closer to zero (from
its initial negative value). In other words, the position provides “insurance against bad
investment opportunities”. If the mean equity premium is not too negative, this hedging
motive dominates and leads to contrarian investment, as in Figure 3.
The intertemporal hedging motive derived here is reminiscent of hedging demand
under risk stressed by Merton [17] and, in the context of Bayesian learning, by Brennan
[4]. Nevertheless, it is unique to the case of ambiguity. Indeed, hedging demand under
risk is zero for a log investor: separability of the objective in (11) implies that the optimal
portfolio does not depend on the continuation value hτ+1/k. In contrast, with multiple
conditionals, the minimizing probability p∗
t (φt) will in general depend on hτ+1/k and
hence on the investment horizon. The presence of ambiguity thus breaks the separability
and generates hedging demand.
Conﬁdence and participation over time
To illustrate the quantitative relevance of changes in conﬁdence, Figure 4 compares
optimal stock weights for myopic investors over the period 1960-2004. The top panel
shows the position of the Bayesian log investor (gray, left scale). This position is highly
levered and ﬂuctuates around the sample mean of 176%. There is no upward trend — the
Bayesian model actually predicts higher stock investment in the 1960s than at the peak
of the 1990s boom. The black line in the top panel is the ambiguity averse investor with
¯ λ =0and α = .15, which corresponds to a 5% signiﬁcance level of the LR test. Since
this position is considerably smaller on average, a second (shifted) scale is marked on the
right hand axis. While the ﬂuctuations in the optimal weight are similar in magnitude
to the Bayesian case — as predicted by (15) — the ambiguity averse position trends up
over time. In particular, it is higher in the 1990s than in the 1960s.
The bottom panel of Figure 4 shows what happens as investors become more risk
averse or more ambiguity averse. The upper black replicates the case ¯ λ =0and α = .15













MLE of Equity Premium
Figure 3: Optimal weight on stocks for log investors as a function of MLE of equity premium.
Dashed black line: investor with α = .15, ¯ λ =0 , sample size t =5years and horizon T =1 0
years. Dotted black line: investor with the same belief and horizon, but sample size t =3 5
y e a r s .T h i c kg r a yl i n e si n d i c a t et h e corresponding myopic positions (T =1 /k), which are zero
when they do not coincide with the positions for T =1 0years. Solid black line:B a y e s i a n
investor (α =1 , ¯ λ =0 ). All numerical calculations are for k =3 0 .
of the upper panel. The gray line corresponds to ¯ λ =0and α = .08 (a signiﬁcance
level of 2.5%), an investor whose conﬁdence is not only lower, but also growing more
slowly. The latter feature explains why the diﬀerence between the two lines is narrower
in the 1990s than in the 1960s. In contrast, introducing multiple likelihoods shifts down
the position in a parallel fashion: an example is the lower black line
¡
α = .15, ¯ λ = .001
¢
.
The latter two investors also go through lengthy periods of optimal nonparticipation. For
comparison, the lower panel also reports optimal positions for Bayesian investors with a
coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion of 5. The solid gray line is the myopic Bayesian, while
the dashed gray line assumes a horizon of T = 30 years. The point here is that once risk
aversion is high enough for the Bayesian model to generate sensible portfolio allocations,
these positions do not vary much over time. Moreover, even with a very long investment
horizon, the trend in the position induced by intertemporal hedging is small.
It is interesting to ask whether the positions of a multiple-priors investor could be
replicated by a Bayesian with an informative prior. For any two points in the ﬁgure,










Log investors: Bayesian ( α=1; left scale) and  α = .15 (right scale)









Bayesian (CRRA = 5; broken) and Ambiguity averse (CRRA = 1; solid)
Figure 4: Optimal stock positions, 1960-2004, for investors who learn from monthly real NYSE
stock returns since 1926. Top panel: log investor with α =1(solid gray; left scale), and log
investor with α = .15 (dotted black; right scale). Bottom panel: broken lines are for Bayesian
investors with CRRA = 5; T =1 /k (dash-dot gray) and T = 30 years (dotted gray); solid
lines are for ambiguity averse log investors; α = .15, ¯ λ =0(top solid black line), α = .08,
¯ λ =0(solid gray line) and α = .15, ¯ λ = .001 (bottom solid black line).
this is always possible: we can reverse engineer a mean and variance for the prior normal
distribution to match the posterior mean, and hence the optimal positions in equation
(12), at any two calendar dates. For example, consider the investor with α = .15 and
¯ λ =0 , whose optimal weight on stocks grows from ωt =5 .8% in December 1976 to
ωt =5 9 .3% in December 2004. A Bayesian with normal prior who chooses the same
positions must start in 1926 from a prior mean of −6.41% p.a. and a prior standard
deviation of .88%. In other words, she must have been essentially convinced that the
equity premium is always negative. Since such extreme and dogmatic pessimism is needed
to match the multiple-priors investor in 1976 and 2004, the optimal position is negative
in all years before 1963. This is in sharp contrast to the multiple-priors investor, who
invests more than 20% in stocks in the early 1960s.
27AA P P E N D I X
A.1 Comparison of predictive probabilities from Section 3.3.
We want to show that the minimal predictive probability for a black ball conditional on observing a
black ball,
min





 (B | θ)dµ1(θ),
is smaller under Scenario 3 than under Scenario 2.
Consider ﬁrst Scenario 2. The set Mα
1 of posteriors (after having observed one black draw) is
constructed by updating only those priors µ
p
0 according to which the black draw was suﬃciently likely ex
ante in the sense of the likelihood-ratio criterion in (6). The ex ante probability of a black draw under
the prior µ
p











It follows that the agent retains only those priors µ
p
0 corresponding to some p in Pα ⊂ P,w h e r e
Pα =
½
p ∈ P : Σλp(λ)+1





(Because all measures in P have support in {1,2,3}, it is easily seen that Pα = P for all α ≤ 3
4.A t
the other extreme, if α =1 ,t h e nPα consists only of those measures in P that maximize Σλp(λ),t h e
expected number of black non-coin balls.) Thus Mα
1 consists of all measures µ
p
















10 [2 Σλp(λ)+1 ]
.











































+ Σλp(λ), for every p in Pα.



















This inequality is used below to draw comparisons with Scenario 3.
Turn now to Scenario 3. Note that
 p (B | B) −  (B | W)=
1
5
for every  p.
28After seeing one black draw, the agent reevaluates which likelihoods in L could have been operative
in the ﬁrst draw. He does this by computing the ex ante probability of a black draw associated with
each  p (and the ﬁxed µ0) - that probability is given by
Z
θ∈{B,W}
 p (B | θ) dµ0 = 1
2 ( p (B | B)+ p (B | W))
= 1
10 (2 Σλp(λ)+1 ) ,
which is identical to the ex ante probability computed in Scenario 2 (see (16)). It follows that the
likelihood-ratio criterion leads to retention of only those likelihoods  p where p lies in Pα, the same set
deﬁned in the discussion of Scenario 2.
The set Mα




 p (B | θ)
 p (B | B)+ p (B | W)





 p (B | B)





Finally, the set P1 (B) of predictive probabilities of a black on the next draw, after having observed




 (B | θ) dµ
p
1 :   ∈ L,p ∈ Pα
)
.
Therefore the minimum predictive probability equals
min
p∈P α,  ∈L
{µ
p
1 (B)[ (B | B) −  (B | W)] +  (B | W)} =
min
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 ∈L





























which is no larger than the minimum predictive probability computed for Scenario 2 (see (17)). This
proves that betting in Scenario 2 is preferable.
It is not diﬃcult to see that there is indiﬀerence between the two scenarios iﬀ there exists λ
∗ ∈ {1,2,3}
such that P = {δλ∗}, that is, there is certainty that there are λ
∗ black non-coin balls. In that case, the
set of likelihoods proposed for Scenario 3 collapses to a singleton.¥
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
For any sequence s∞ =( s1,s 2,...), denote by φt the empirical measure on S corresponding to the ﬁrst t
observations. We focus on the set Ω of sequences for which φt → φ; this set has measure one under the
truth. Fix a sequence s∞ ∈ Ω.
As in the text, use the notation ( s)s∈S for likelihood sequences ( t) such that  j =  k if sj = sk.
Suppose that the relative frequencies of the states in a (ﬁnite or inﬁnite) sample are represented by a
29probability measure λ on S — below we will take λ to be φt or φ. Given a likelihood sequence ( s)s∈S ,
the likelihood of the sample conditional on the parameter value θ is then




We want to show that, for every sequence of posteriors {µt} with µt ∈ Mα
t for all t,t h ep o s t e r i o r
probability of the parameter value θ
∗ converges (uniformly) to one. By the deﬁnition of Mα
t ,f o re v e r y




0 ,  t,(t)
´
, that is, a theory satisfying the conditions in
(6), such that µt is the Bayesian update of µ
(t)











Here the t0s in brackets indicate the place of the posterior in the given sequence of posteriors {µt} —t h e y
are needed to account for the fact that not all µt in the sequence {µt} need to be updates of the same
initial prior µ0, or be updated along the same likelihood sequence. (As well, the sequence of updates of
ag i v e nµ0 along a given sequence of likelihoods need not be admissible at all dates.) Thus our objective





0 ,  t,(t))=1 , (18)




0 ,  t,(t)
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j (sj | θ) − max
( s)
f H (φt,( s),θ
∗).
Here ηt is the log likelihood ratio between the likelihood of the sample under  t at the parameter value
θ and the likelihood of the sample under the sequence ( s) that maximizes the likelihood of the sample
given the parameter θ




0 ,  t,(t)
´



















































Claim 1: For every  >0 there exists T such that ηt
¡
θ, t,(t)¢
≤−  , for all t>T( ), θ 6= θ
∗ and for all












0 ,  t,(t)
´
.
Claim 3:T h e r ee x i s t sT such that µ
(t)
0 (θ




0 ,  t,(t)
´
.






t(ηt(θ, t,(t))−ηt(θ∗, t,(t))) → 0
30uniformly. Claim 3 and hypothesis (ii) imply that µ
(t)
0 (θ
∗) >κfor large enough t, and (18) follows.
P r o o fo fC l a i m1 :If  t is to be chosen to maximize 1
tΣt
j=1log j (sj | θ), it is wlog to focus on sequences






j (sj | θ) ≤ max( s) e H (φt,( s),θ) (19)
By deﬁnition of H and the identiﬁcation hypothesis (i),t h e r ee x i s t s >0 such that
max( s) e H (φ,( s),θ) ≤ H (θ
∗) − 2 , for all θ 6= θ
∗.
Thus the Maximum Theorem implies that, for some suﬃciently large T,
max( s) e H (φt,( s),θ) ≤ max( s) e H (φt,( s),θ
∗) −  , (20)
for all θ 6= θ
∗ and t>T. The claim now follows from (19).















φt (s)log s (s|θ
∗).
By the deﬁnition of Mα
t , every element of a sequence of admissible theories ³
µ
(t)





b µ0,b  t
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0 (θ); Pr(st;b µ0, b  t) is deﬁned similarly. Consider the long
run behavior of maxb µ0,b  t Pr(st;b µ0, b  t), the data density under the maximum likelihood theory. We claim
that
"
maxb µ0,b  t Pr(st;b µ0, b  t)






maxb µ0,b  t
X
θ∈Θ





Claim 1 implies that (for all t>T)
maxˆ µ0,ˆ  tˆ µ0 (θ
∗)e
tηt(θ∗,ˆ  t)
≤ maxˆ µ0,ˆ  t
X
θ∈Θ
ˆ µ0 (θ) e
tηt(θ,ˆ  t)
≤ maxˆ µ0,ˆ  tˆ µ0 (θ
∗) e
tηt(θ∗,ˆ  t) +( 1− ˆ µ0 (θ
∗))e− t.
We have assumed that there is a prior µ0 such that µ0 (θ
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´
≤ 0 and maxˆ  tηt
³
θ
∗, ˆ  t
´
=0 . (24)
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and hence also (23).
Combining (22) and (21), it now follows that, for any sequence of admissible theories ³
µ
(t)
















0 ,  t,(t))
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≤ e−δ < 1
for inﬁnitely many t, contradicting (25). This proves Claim 2.
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≤ e−δ < 1,
which contradicts (25).
A.3 Proof of (14)
As in the text, time is measured in months, so that the history st consists of tk realizations of the state.






































denote the sequence that maximizes (26) for ﬁxed θ. This sequence is independent of θ and has




depends on the sample




























32Indeed, if θ ∈ Mα
t , then there exists some λ









must also pass that criterion, since its likelihood is at least as high. In contrast,
if θ/ ∈ Mα
t , then there is no λ





































































with respect to θ delivers the MLE
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which implies the inequality in (14).¥
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